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Law: Navigating The Boundaries
Of State Authority On Drug
Pricing
ABSTRACT The California drug transparency bill (SB-17), signed into law
in October 2017, seeks to promote transparency in pharmaceutical
pricing, enhance understanding about pharmaceutical pricing trends,
and assist in managing pharmaceutical costs. This article examines the
legal and regulatory aspects of SB-17, explores legal challenges to the law,
compares it to other state efforts to address rising drug prices, and
discusses how California can maximize the impact of SB-17 by coupling
the law with other incentives. While SB-17 might not significantly reduce
drug prices, the new law represents a meaningful step for one state
seeking to negotiate the political and legal boundaries of state action to
rein in drug prices.
P
rescription drug spending per cap-
ita is far higher in the United States
than in other high-income coun-
tries, exceeding $1,000 per person
in 2016.1 The rate of spending
growth for retail prescription drugs has declined
significantly (from8.9 percent in 2015 to 1.3 per-
cent in 2016),2 but prescription drug costs re-
main a financial burden for many people. In a
2016 national survey, 20 percent of adults re-
ported that they had not filled a drug prescrip-
tion in the past year because of cost.3 Moreover,
formanypeople, price shopping for prescription
drugs remains a challenge.4,5 In a 2017 poll, vot-
ers ranked prescription drug prices and out-of-
pocket spending as far more important than any
other health policy issue, including fixing the
Affordable Care Act.6
Following the recent outcry about the afford-
ability of prescription drugs, Congress has held
hearings7 and introduced bills8–10 attempting to
make prescription drugs more affordable—with
negligible success. In response,many state legis-
latures have taken up the mantle of controlling
prescription drug spending. In 2018, forty-four
states introduced and twenty-nine states passed
legislation designed to increase the accessibility
and affordability of prescription medications.11
States have sought to increase price transparen-
cy, prevent “excessive” price increases, regulate
pharmacy benefit managers, and allow drug
importation from Canada.11 Fulfilling its role
as an innovator state, California has led the
way toward price transparency. In October 2017
Gov. Jerry Brown signed Senate Bill 17 (SB-17),
a bill that seeks to improve drug price transpar-
ency and improve price negotiations by requir-
ing specific disclosures from pharmaceutical
manufacturers and health insurers.
In the absence of federal action, states have
recently proposed an array of methods to regu-
late drug prices, but the boundaries of state
power to regulate pharmaceutical prices remain
vague. In addition, any state that passes new
legislation should expect a formidable legal chal-
lenge from the pharmaceutical industry. In a
setback for states hoping to address rising drug
prices, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals de-
clared aMaryland law prohibiting price gouging
for generic medications12 unconstitutional be-
cause it violated the dormant commerce clause,
which bans states from unduly burdening inter-
state commerce.13 In light of that ruling and the
uncertainty about the limits of state action, the
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precedents that will be set in legal challenges to
SB-17 may help resolve questions about states’
power and serve as a foundation for other states
looking topassmeaningful legislation toaddress
rising drug costs. This commentary examines
the provisions of SB-17, discusses the potential
legal challenges to it, and finds that SB-17, while
carefully crafted to avoid many preemption is-
sues, may have limited impact unless it is cou-
pled with other policies.
Requiring Pricing Disclosure
To promote transparency in pharmaceutical
pricing, enhance understanding about pricing
trends, and assist payers in the management
of pharmaceutical costs, SB-17 requires insurers
and manufacturers to disclose information on
several aspects of pricing. Companies that fail
to comply face civil penalties.
Disclosures By Insurers Health plans that
file annual rate information with the California
Department of Managed Health Care or Depart-
ment of Insurance must submit an additional
annual report that names the twenty-five most
frequently prescribed drugs, the twenty-five
most costly drugs in terms of total annual spend-
ing, and the twenty-five drugs with the greatest
increase in total annual spending.14 In addition,
large employer groupplansmust specify the por-
tion of premiums attributable to prescription
drugs and designate the proportion of any pre-
mium increase due to prescription costs versus
other sources (for example, inpatient care, out-
patient care, and physician services). SB-17 also
requires these two departments to report aggre-
gated information to state legislators and the
public and to hold public meetings to discuss
their findings. However, with the exception of
reported aggregated information, the agencies
must keep SB-17 disclosures confidential.
Disclosures By Manufacturers SB-17 re-
quires pharmaceutical manufacturers to notify
purchasers at least sixty days before any price
increase that exceeds 16 percent over a two-year
period for all drugs with a wholesale acquisition
cost greater than $40.15 Federal law defines
this cost as the manufacturer’s list price for
the drug to wholesalers or direct purchasers in
the United States, not including rebates or other
discounts.16 In addition, manufacturers must
notify the California Office of Statewide Health
Planning and Development about any newly
marketed pharmaceutical with a wholesale ac-
quisition cost above the threshold of a specialty
drugunderMedicare PartD (more than$670per
month).17 Manufacturers must also provide the
office with information on the drug’s usage (for
example, indication and dosage), the factors
used to determine the wholesale acquisition
cost, and marketing materials. However, the
law limits disclosure requirements to informa-
tion already in the public domain, which pro-
vides little additional transparency.
Overall, these provisions will provide policy
makers with information that might otherwise
be difficult to collect and aggregate. However,
their real value lies in their ability to help shape
the scope of state legal boundaries surrounding
drug pricing reform.
Challenges In State Regulation Of
Drug Prices
The pharmaceutical industry has consistently
challenged states’ attempts to promote price
transparency and regulate price increases. In
fact, the contours of SB-17 appear designed to
avoidpitfalls encounteredby other states in their
attempts to constrain drug prices, including pre-
emption by the federal Employee Retirement In-
comeSecurityAct (ERISA) of 1974 and violations
of trade-secret laws.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act
Preemption ERISA creates significant barriers
to state health reform efforts that affect employ-
ee benefit plans, including prescription drug
coverage.With the goal of establishing uniformi-
ty across states, ERISA establishes minimum
standards for employee pension and benefit
plans and preempts the ability of states to pass
laws that “relate to” employee benefit plans.18
While ERISA exempts state insurance regula-
tions from this preemption, it does not deem
self-insured employer benefits to be insurance,
and therefore it preempts any state attempt to
pass legislation that relates to self-insured em-
ployerplans—whichcoverapproximately60per-
cent of Americans with employer-sponsored in-
surance.19,20
As a result, ERISA has had severe consequenc-
es for states’ attempts to control health care costs
and improve price transparency. In 2016 the US
Supreme Court ruled in Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual
InsuranceCo. thatVermont couldnot require self-
insured employers to report their health care
claims data to the state all-payer claims database,
because such reporting impermissibly intrudes
on central matters of ERISA plan administra-
tion.21 Indeed, citing Gobeille, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that ERISA preempted
the application of an Iowa law—which required
pharmacy benefit managers to disclose how they
priced generic medications to the state insur-
ance commissioner—from applying tomanagers
that served ERISA plans.22 As a result, ERISA has
become a powerful barrier to several forms of
health care price transparency legislation, be-
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cause states must choose between passing laws
that will not benefit a large section of the popu-
lation (those with self-insured employer-based
coverage) and risking being dragged through
an uncertain, and currently unfavorable, legal
battle over the scope of ERISA preemption.23
SB-17 attempts to avoid ERISA preemption by
requiring disclosures only from plans regulated
by the Department of Managed Health Care or
the Department of Insurance, which includes
large and small employer group plans but not
plans of self-insured employers. As a result, law-
makers will not have pharmaceutical spending
data for the employees of some of the largest
employers in the state when considering other
measures to address drug prices.
Trade Secrets The pharmaceutical industry
has also challenged states’ efforts to increase
price transparency for violating federal and state
trade-secret laws.24 In 2017 Nevada passed Sen-
ate Bill 539, which required manufacturers of
“essential” diabetes drugs to provide informa-
tion to the state that included the costs of
manufacturing and marketing the drugs and
the amount of profits attributed to them. In ad-
dition, if amanufacturer increases thewholesale
acquisition cost bymore than the rate ofmedical
inflation, it must provide the Nevada Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services with an
explanation of the factors that contributed to
the increase and the percentage of the total in-
crease in price that is attributable to each factor.
Nevada’s law also amended the state’s definition
of a trade secret to specifically exclude any infor-
mation that the law requires, so that the state can
publish the information. Following a civil suit,24
however, filed by the trade organizations that
represent the interests of pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies—Pharmaceutical Re-
search and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)
and Biotechnology Innovation Organization
(BIO)—Nevada’s Department of Health and Hu-
man Services issued regulations that allow phar-
maceutical manufacturers or pharmacy benefit
managers to request confidentiality of the infor-
mation submitted to the state.25 The state will
keep confidential any information it reasonably
considers to meet the standards of a trade secret
under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act of
2016 (18 US Code, section 1836) or Exemption
4 of the federal Freedom of Information Act
[5 US Code, section 552(b)(4)].
In contrast to the Nevada law, SB-17 attempts
to avoid violating trade-secrets protections by
limiting required disclosures to publicly avail-
able information or requiring disclosures to
agencies (such as the Office of Statewide Health
Planning and Development) that must keep the
information confidential. While the wholesale
acquisition cost is publicly available, it remains
unclear whether advance notification of an im-
pending increase above a threshold—such as
that required by SB-17—constitutes a trade
secret.
Challenges To SB-17
Unlike legislation in other states, SB-17 does not
specifically limit price increases or allow state
officials to intervene if they believe a manufac-
turer has engaged in price gouging. At the most
fundamental level, SB-17 simply requires drug
manufacturers to provide both advance warning
of price increases above a threshold and detailed
information about newly marketed specialty
drugs. Nonetheless, in December 2017 PhRMA
filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern
District of California, challenging SB-17 for vio-
lating the dormant commerce clause and the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.26
Dormant Commerce Clause The Constitu-
tion gives Congress the power to regulate inter-
state commerce, and the dormant commerce
clause is a long-standing judicial interpretation
that prohibits states from passing laws that dis-
criminate against or excessively burden inter-
state commerce without sufficient offsetting
local benefits.27 In Healy v. Beer Institute the Su-
preme Court held that the externality principle
of the dormant commerce clause forbids states
from directly regulating commerce that occurs
outside of the regulating state, “regardless of
whether the statute’s extraterritorial reach was
intended by the legislature.”28
PhRMAalleges that SB-17 violates thedormant
commerce clause because it requires advance
notice of increases to the wholesale acquisition
cost, thereby delaying price increases in external
markets. Under SB-17 a manufacturer cannot
increase the wholesale acquisition cost without
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waiting sixty days or facing financial penalities.26
Therefore, because contract prices with whole-
salers, hospitals, pharmacies, pharmacy benefit
managers, payers, and others are typically based
on the wholesale acquisition cost, PhRMA as-
serts that SB-17 becomes an unconstitutional
nationwide ban on price increases for certain
drugs, unless the State of California receives
sixty-day advance notification.26
Until recently, many courts narrowly inter-
preted the externality principle to strike down
only laws that controlled prices or required
price affirmation, linked in-state prices to those
charged elsewhere, or raised costs for out-
of-state consumers or rival businesses.29 In
April 2018, however, a three-judge panel of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the
principle more broadly to find that Maryland’s
law prohibiting price gouging for essential off-
patent or generic drugs12 violated the dormant
commerce clause. The court held that because
the law applied to drugs “made available for sale
within the state,” it could apply to drugs that
were never actually sold in Maryland. The court
reasoned that the law is “effectively a price con-
trol statute that instructs manufacturers and
wholesale distributors as to the prices they are
permitted to charge in transactions that do not
takeplace inMaryland.”13 In July2018 theFourth
Circuit Court of Appeals denied the state’s peti-
tion to have the case reheard by the entire court,
but Judge Wynn issued a dissent,30 likely setting
up an appeal to the Supreme Court.
In contrast to Maryland’s anti–price gouging
law,12 SB-17 requires only advance notice of price
increases and allows increases of any size (with
proper notification). Furthermore, significant
legal uncertainty surrounds the interpretation
of the dormant commerce clause, and a decision
by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on the
Maryland law is not binding on the PhRMA case
against SB-17 in theDistrict Court for theEastern
District of California. Given these realities, it is
not clear how the District Court will rule. None-
theless, the District Court’s decision on SB-17
will likely have significant implications for other
challenges to drug pricing legislation.
Free Speech And Due Process In addition to
its dormant commerce clause claim, PhRMA ar-
gues that SB-17 violates pharmaceutical manu-
facturers’ First Amendment right to free speech
and their Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process.26 PhRMA alleges that SB-17 violates the
First Amendment when it singles out manufac-
turers as the only entity that must give advance
notice of pharmaceutical price increases, when
other entities, such as pharmacy benefit manag-
ers, also affect prices. PhRMA also argues that
SB-17 unnecessarily requires manufacturers to
justify a price increase using only two potential
justifications: a “change or improvement” in the
drug. The law does not consider other typical
justifications for price increases (such as raising
capital for researchorproviding increasing value
to the health systemby decreasing overall spend-
ing), which essentially forces manufacturers to
provide a false reason or abstain from answering
the question. Finally, PhRMA claims that SB-17
violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it does not specify whether
wholesale acquisition cost increases before Jan-
uary 1, 2018, would trigger SB-17’s reporting
requirements—which would make the law retro-
active.26 While California could remedy this po-
tential violation by considering only prospective
price increases, the state appears poised to apply
the requirement retrospectively, pending a rul-
ing in PhRMA’s lawsuit.
To pass effective legislation, state lawmakers
need clear signals from the courts regarding the
boundaries of state regulation of all health care
prices, including pharmaceutical prices. Thus,
SB-17 represents an important effort by a state
looking to pass meaningful legislation that will
withstand legal challenges by the pharmaceuti-
cal industry and help define the contours of per-
missible state action. Nonetheless, SB-17 will
have minimal impact unless the state takes addi-
tional measures to address rising drug prices.
Implications Of SB-17 For Drug
Pricing
Shortly after its passage, SB-17 was dubbed “the
nation’s most comprehensive law aimed at shin-
ing a light on prescription drug prices.”31 While
the law makes significant strides, the crafting of
SB-17 to avoid preemption pitfalls constrains its
reach in several ways. Indeed, SB-17 may have
unintended consequences, including specula-
tion in the pharmaceutical supply chain, price





to address rising drug
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Unintended Consequences First, the lawwill
do little to directly reduce drug prices overall,
because pharmaceutical manufacturers can
spreadprice increases out across drug categories
and adjust rebates to maintain profits. The law
relies on the wholesale acquisition cost to avoid
trade-secret issues, but as a result, it does not
include information on confidential rebates and
price discounts provided to pharmacy benefit
managers, which often dramatically alter the ac-
tual prices. SB-17 thus leaves open several ave-
nues for price manipulation.
Second, SB-17’s advance notice requirement
provides useful information for direct purchas-
ers, policy makers, and insurers, but it also cre-
ates opportunities for market manipulation. For
instance, it gives drug manufacturers the oppor-
tunity to raise their prices in concert. If a manu-
facturer of a competing drug receives advance
notice of a competitor’s price increase, it could
commensurately increase the price of its drug
with minimal risk of losing sales to the competi-
tion.32,33 In turn, SB-17 could allow competing
firms to signal their intent to increase prices,
which could lead to tacit price collusion.
Third, SB-17 encourages pharmacies to stock-
pile drugs when they receive notice of a pending
price increase.34 Distribution service agreements
between manufacturers and wholesalers gener-
ally limit the amount of inventory that a whole-
saler can hold, but pharmacies are not typically
bound by similar contracts. As a result, when
pharmacies—especially those affiliated with or
owned by a pharmacy benefit manager or an
insurer—receive sixty days’ advance notice, they
can purchase extra inventory at the lower price
but sell at a higher price later.34 Such stockpiling
can create artificial shortages for pharmacies
that do not receive advance notice. The pending
merger between Aetna, an insurer, and CVS
Health, a pharmacy group with an embedded
pharmacy benefitmanager,may exacerbate such
effects.
Multiple Strategies Needed Despite the po-
tential for unintended consequences and other
limitations in SB-17, the law represents a mean-
ingful initial step in determining what power
states have to address the affordability of pre-
scription drugs. Transparency alone, however,
is insufficient to encourage patients to price-
shop. Research on online price transparency ini-
tiatives finds only modest changes in patient
behavior,35,36 but combining price transparency
with targeted consumer incentives can lead to
widespread price-shopping.37 Augmenting price
transparency information with a tangible finan-
cial incentive, such as reference pricing, has
been found to be effective in reducing pharma-
ceutical spendingand is a viablenext step indrug
pricing policy.38
Conclusion
California’s SB-17 constitutes a critical part of a
movement by states to reduce pharmaceutical
prices and clarify the scope of states’ power to
address health care prices more generally. Al-
though it is innovative, SB-17 is unlikely to have
a significant impact on drug spending without
additional incentives for consumers to use low-
er-priced drugs. Nonetheless, the law remains a
vital step in defining state authority and reflects
California’s status as a leader among states look-
ing to control prescription drug prices. ▪
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